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Abstract—In December 2017, the Third Generation Partner-
ship Project (3GPP) released the first set of specifications for 5G
New Radio (NR), which is currently the most widely accepted
5G cellular standard. 5G NR is expected to replace LTE and
previous generations of cellular technology over the next several
years, providing higher throughput, lower latency, and a host of
new features. Similar to LTE, the 5G NR physical layer consists
of several physical channels and signals, most of which are vital to
the operation of the network. Unfortunately, like for any wireless
technology, disruption through radio jamming is possible. This
paper investigates the extent to which 5G NR is vulnerable to
jamming and spoofing, by analyzing the physical downlink and
uplink control channels and signals. We identify the weakest
links in the 5G NR frame, and propose mitigation strategies that
should be taken into account during implementation of 5G NR
chipsets and base stations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
released the specifications for 5G New Radio (NR), which is
expected to be the primary 5G standard moving forward. In
addition to providing commercial communications services,
cellular networks are used to broadcast emergency information,
announcing natural disasters and other crises. As we have
seen with LTE, despite being designed for commercial com-
munications, the latest cellular technology is often utilized for
mission-critical applications such as public safety and military
communications. Just as we have become dependent on LTE,
over the next decade we will likely become dependent on 5G
NR, which is why we must ensure it is secure and available
when and where it is needed. Unfortunately, like any wireless
technology, disruption through deliberate radio frequency (RF)
interference, or jamming, is possible.
The objectives of this article are to outline and motivate
the need for 5G network security and reliability research, by
providing insights into physical (PHY) layer vulnerabilities of
5G NR and surveying mitigation techniques that can harden the
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Fig. 1. Unlike LTE, 5G NR defines a flexible frame structure and numerology.
PHY layer of next generation 5G deployments. We individually
analyze each physical control channel and signal, then compare
them in order to identify the weakest link. This paper concludes
with a survey of mitigation techniques that should be taken
into account during implementation, in order to mitigate the
jamming attacks discussed in this paper.
II. BACKGROUND OF 5G NR
The 5G NR architecture is composed of components of
LTE combined with a new radio access technology that is
not backwards compatible with LTE. 5G NR is operable from
below 1 GHz to 100 GHz, making it the first generation of
cellular technology with such a flexible frequency range.
As with LTE, the downlink (DL) uses standard orthogonal
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) with a cyclic prefix.
The uplink (UL), however, has the option between normal
OFDM just like the downlink, or DFT spread OFDM (DFT-
s-OFDM), which is essentially the same that LTE uses in its
uplink. The DFT-s-OFDM mode does not support multi-stream
transmissions and is intended for coverage-limited cases [1].
5G NR supports frequency division duplexing (FDD) and
time division duplexing (TDD). Figure 2 shows an example of
the downlink frame. The 5G NR frame structure is similar to
LTE, but incorporates much more flexibility and includes some
important modifications. Similar to LTE, every frame is 10 ms
long in duration, there are 10 subframes in one frame, and
there are 14 OFDM symbols in a slot. A major difference is
that the number of slots per subframe (which was always equal
to two in LTE), is now variable. More specifically, the number
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TABLE I
OPTIONS IN 5G NR FOR SUBCARRIER SPACING [2]
Subcarrier
Spacing
Slots per
Subframe
Meant for
Carriers...
Min BW
[MHz]
Max BW
[MHz]
15 kHz 1
< 6 GHz
4.32 49.5
30 kHz 2 8.64 99
60 kHz 4 17.28 198
120 kHz 8
> 24 GHz
34.56 396
240 kHz 16 69.12 397.44
TABLE II
NUMBER OF RBS FOR DIFFERENT BWS AND SUBCARRIER SPACINGS
Spacing
5
MHz
10
MHz
15
MHz
20
MHz
25
MHz
30
MHz
40
MHz
50
MHz
60
MHz
70
MHz
80
MHz
90
MHz
100
MHz
15 kHz 25 52 79 106 133 160 216 270
30 kHz 11 24 38 51 65 78 106 133 162 189 217 245 273
60 kHz 11 18 24 31 38 51 65 79 93 107 121 135
of slots per frame is a function of the subcarrier spacing, which
varies between 15 and 240 kHz. In Table I we list the different
options and the carrier frequencies they are designed for.
Similar to LTE, a Resource Element (RE) is one subcarrier by
one OFDM symbol. Unlike LTE, the Resource Block (RB) is 12
subcarriers by 1 OFDM symbol. Table II indicates the number
of RBs as a function of system bandwidth and subcarrier
spacing when below 6 GHz.
III. PHYSICAL LAYER VULNERABILITIES OF 5G NR
This section analyzes each specific physical channel and
signal of 5G NR, according to 3GPP Release 15, to determine
how vulnerable it is to jamming and spoofing. The extent to
which a physical channel or signal is vulnerable to jamming
is highly influenced by the sparsity of that channel/signal with
respect to the entire time-frequency resource grid [3]. A factor
that reduces the vulnerability of a channel/signal is whether it
is mapped to the time-frequency resource grid using a dynamic
scheme that involves higher layer parameters (that a jammer
may not know).
5G NR has been designed with the option to be used above
24 GHz. Operating in the millimeter wave band alone improves
the resilience to jamming. The development involved in building
a jammer that targets cells above 24 GHz will take significantly
more hardware knowledge, time, and money. Therefore, we
keep the analysis in this paper specific to cells operating in
sub-6 GHz bands.
A. Synchronization Signals
Similar to LTE, 5G NR contains a Primary Synchronization
Signal (PSS) and Secondary Synchronization Signal (SSS)
which together are used for frame/slot/symbol timing as well as
conveying the Physical Cell ID. There are 1008 unique Physical
Cell IDs in 5G NR, the PSS has three possible combinations
and the SSS has 336 combinations.
The PSS is made up of an m-sequence of length 127, mapped
to a contiguous set of 127 subcarriers within the same OFDM
symbol. An m-sequence is a type of pseudorandom binary
sequence that is spectrally flat except the DC term.
The SSS is also a sequence of length 127, mapped to the
same subcarriers as the PSS but a different OFDM symbol.
The SSS uses a Gold sequence, which is formed by combining
two m-sequences. Gold sequences within the same set have
low cross-correlation, allowing a UE to distinguish between
several nearby base stations on the same carrier at low signal-
to-noise-plus-interference ratio (SINR), making them resilient
to jamming.
Unlike LTE, the PSS and SSS are not always mapped to
the downlink resource grid in the same location. The mapping
depends on the cell’s subcarrier spacing, the carrier frequency,
and the parameter offset-ref-low-scs-ref-PRB [2]. There are
three different options for subcarrier spacing below 6 GHz (15,
30, 60 kHz), and for all three options the PSS and SSS are
mapped to the first two slots for carriers below 3 GHz, and
the first four slots for those above 3 GHz. An example of PSS
and SSS mapping is shown in Figure 2 for a carrier below 3
GHz.
A jammer designed to jam the PSS and/or SSS selectively
in time has to synchronize to the cell in time, and identify the
subcarrier spacing (which might already be known beforehand
using publicly available band plans). This is only a little more
complicated than PSS/SSS jamming in LTE.
However, just as in LTE, it may be more effective for an
adversary to transmit fake PSS/SSS signals rather than attempt
to inject noise on top of the existing PSS/SSS, because it
does not have to synchronize to a cell [3]. It also uses less
power because the PSS and SSS are designed to be detected at
low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), thus requiring more jammer
power to successfully jam the signal. Although it depends on
the chipset and whether any PSS/SSS blacklisting mechanism
exists, it may only be necessary to spoof the PSS. Spoofing
the PSS (and SSS) involves the attacker transmitting several
fake PSS’s, asynchronous to the target 5G NR frame(s) (i.e.,
not overlapping in time with the real PSS) and at higher power.
PSS/SSS spoofing can cause denial of service (DoS), which
would likely occur during initial cell search [4].
Similar to LTE, the 5G NR specifications do not specify
the behavior of the UE when it detects a valid PSS with
no associated SSS [5]. Hence, the effects of PSS spoofing
will be implementation-specific. The more fake PSSs that are
transmitted, the more sophisticated of a blacklisting mechanism
is required for mitigation.
B. Physical Broadcast Channel
The Physical Broadcast Channel (PBCH) is transmitted in the
same slots as the PSS and SSS, an example of which is shown
in Figure 2. The PBCH region spans more subcarriers than
the PSS/SSS; it occupies 240 subcarriers, across 12 OFDM
symbols for a carrier below 3 GHz, and 24 symbols for a
carrier above 3 GHz. The information carried on the PBCH is
known as the Master Information Block (MIB), which includes
parameters such as the subcarrier spacing, position of downlink
reference signals, and the position of downlink control channel.
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Fig. 2. An example of the 5G NR downlink signal frame structure for a 20 MHz signal with 30 kHz subcarrier spacing, using a carrier below 3 GHz.
All of this information is vital to a UE in order to attach to a
cell.
1) Jamming Vulnerability of the PBCH: The symbols
assigned to the PBCH region are all within two or four slots
of each other (depending on whether the carrier is below or
above 3 GHz respectively), so a jammer selectively targeting
the PBCH will appear to have a very low duty cycle, especially
at the higher subcarrier spacings where the duration of one
slot is lower.
By jamming the PBCH, UEs will not be able to access critical
information they need to connect to a cell, thus preventing new
UEs from accessing one or more cells. PBCH jamming can
be performed in a time-selective manner if the jammer can
synchronize to the target cell. Otherwise, the jammer could
simply jam the subcarriers the PBCH is on using 100% duty
cycle. This latter approach involves jamming 240 subcarriers,
and to provide some perspective, a 20 MHz downlink using
15 kHz subcarrier spacing has 1272 subcarriers. Thus, it would
involve jamming 19% of the downlink signal, leading to a
jamming gain around 7 dB w.r.t. barrage jamming.
2) Sniffing and Spoofing Vulnerability of the PBCH: Despite
the large number of changes in the PHY layer of 5G NR, most
of the underlying protocol implementations are very similar to
those of LTE starting in 3GPP Release 8. As a result, both the
MIB and System Information Block (SIB) messages maintain a
similar structure and payload to LTE. While the MIB message
contains essential PHY layer configuration necessary by the
UE to establish a radio link with a cell, the SIB messages
contain detailed information on the configuration of the cell
and overall network. As described in [6], the SIB messages
provide information such as the idle timer configuration of the
network, unique identifiers of the cell, and the RB mapping
of critical control channels. Further details are included in
the SIB messages which provide information on the received
power thresholds that trigger a handover to another cell and
similar mobility actions. This information, although not always
necessary before the UE establishes a secure and encrypted
connection with the network, is always broadcasted in the clear.
As previously discussed in the literature in the context of LTE,
this information could be leveraged by an adversary.
It is worth noting that SIB and Radio Resource Control
(RRC) messages in 5G NR include multiple new parameters,
such as a list of cells to be added to a whitelist or blacklist.
Considering that these messages occur prior to authentication
and are not protected, it is likely that some of these fields could
potentially be leveraged for security exploits against the 5G
NR protocol. This could be achieved, for example, by spoofing
SIB messages or impersonating a base station during the RRC
handshake.
The 5G NR specifications also use a very similar RRC and
Non-Access Stratum (NAS) protocol architecture as LTE. As
a result, there is still a number of pre-authentication messages
implicitly trusted by both the UE and the base station. By
both impersonating a UE or a base station, an adversary can
leverage exploits already known in LTE networks [7], [8].
C. Physical Downlink Control Channel
The Physical Downlink Control Channel (PDCCH) is used
to send control information to the UEs on a per-slot basis. It is
used to schedule downlink transmissions, uplink transmissions,
modulation and coding format of those transmissions, and
hybrid-ARQ information [9]. The PDCCH can appear on any
subcarrier; so the jammer must decode the parameter CORESET-
freq-dom [2]. The parameter CORESET-time-dur, which can
take on values 1, 2, or 3, indicates how many OFDM symbols
the PDCCH occupies each slot [2]. The PDCCH always starts
in the first symbol of each slot, is QPSK modulated and uses
polar coding.
In order to jam all possible locations the PDCCH might
reside in, assuming knowledge of CORESET-freq-dom, the
jammer would have to jam every subcarrier, using a duty
cycle of either 7%, 14%, or 21% depending on the value of
CORESET-time-dur. This type of pulsed jamming attack can
also act as a form of automatic gain control jamming [10].
D. Reference Signals
5G NR includes several reference signals (RSs) which
act as pilots. Unlike LTE, Demodulation RS (DM-RS) are
separated by physical channel, because 5G NR does not include
cell specific reference signals. There is a separate DM-RS
for the PDSCH, PUSCH, PDCCH, PUCCH, and PBCH. In
addition, there is the Phase-tracking RS (PT-RS) for the PDSCH
and PUSCH, Channel state information RS (CSI-RS) for the
downlink, and Sounding RS (SRS) for the uplink [2]. We will
focus on the RSs that are most vulnerable to jamming.
From the perspective of the jammer, the best RS to jam
would be the one that requires the least amount of energy to
jam (i.e. least number of REs per frame), but also be vital
to the operation of the link. The DM-RS for the PBCH fits
the bill, because it is in the same spot every frame and only
requires knowledge of the cell ID and where the PBCH is
located, which can easily be known if the jammer is already
able to time-synchronize to the frame. The DM-RS for the
PBCH occupies 1⁄4 of the REs assigned to the PBCH. It is also
possible to jam the DM-RS for the PBCH without needing to
synchronize to the cell, by jamming the correct 60 subcarriers.
Phase-tracking RS for the PDSCH are only used when the
higher layer parameter Downlink-PTRS-Config is set to ON, and
even then the mapping is a function of parameters timeDensity
and frequencyDensity. The effectiveness of a downlink PT-RS
jamming attack is not clear using the information currently
available, because we would need to know how often PT-RS are
enabled in practice, and what density the base station vendors
decide to use as a default.
E. Downlink and Uplink User Data
The Physical Downlink Shared Channel (PDSCH) and
Physical Uplink Shared Channel (PUSCH) are used to transmit
user data from the base station to the UE and vice versa, and
represent the bulk of the frame. While surgically jamming
these channels is possible, the adversary might as well jam the
entire uplink or downlink signal (and hence this is what we
show in Figure 3). Thus, PDSCH and PUSCH jamming are
two of the least important threats to consider.
F. Physical Uplink Control Channel
The Physical Uplink Control Channel (PUCCH) is used by
the UE to send the base station a variety of control information,
including hybrid-ARQ acknowledgments, scheduling requests,
and channel state information [9]. There are five different
PUCCH formats, and there are a variety of parameters provided
by the higher layer to inform the UE about which subcarriers
and symbols to transmit each PUCCH message on. The PUCCH
has an option for intra-slot hopping, which acts as a great
defense mechanism. The PUCCH is modulated with either
BPSK or QPSK and uses either repetition code, simplex code,
Reed Muller code, or polar code (depending on the number of
bits to transmit). Similar to LTE, uplink control information
can also be carried on the PUSCH, meaning jamming just
the PUCCH will not block all uplink control information. All
of these factors make the PUCCH an extremely complicated
physical channel to jam.
G. Physical Random Access Channel
The 5G NR random access procedure for regular UEs is very
similar to that of LTE. When a UE wants to connect to a cell,
it first receives the PSS, SSS, and PBCH. After synchronizing
to the cell in time and frequency, it transmits a preamble over
the Physical Random Access Channel (PRACH), which takes
the form of a Zadoff-Chu sequence that embeds a value used
to temporarily identify the UE. The base station broadcasts the
candidate locations of the PRACH (in time and frequency) in
case a UE wants to connect. The possible configurations are
listed in Table 6.3.3.2-2 of [2]. As with LTE, the large number
of possible locations, and the complexity required to decode
the positions in real time, makes the PRACH an unlikely target
for a jammer. On the other hand PRACH spoofing, where
the UEs flood the PRACH might be feasible, but the 5G NR
specifications do not specify the behavior of the base station
when encountering a large number of invalid preambles.
IV. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
This section compares the attacks in terms of power
efficiency and complexity to quantify the vulnerability of 5G
NR, as a basis for developing effective protocol improvement
and hardening techniques. First, we need to introduce two
different ways of measuring the received jammer-to-signal
ratio (J/S), that is, the ratio of the received jamming signal
power to the received 5G NR signal power.
Following the convention in [3], we define J/SCH as the
J/S that only takes into account the specific REs of the channel
or signal being jammed. For example, when jamming the
broadcast channel (the light purple region in Figure 2), it
is assumed the jammer will place its energy on top of the
broadcast channel in time and frequency, and not transmit on
any other REs (this is an ideal case from the perspective of
the jammer). Thus, J/SCH in this instance corresponds to the
average received signal power from the jammer divided by the
averaged received power of only the broadcast channel.
J/S averaged over an entire radio frame is referred to as
J/SF . Using the previous example of jamming the broadcast
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Fig. 3. Ranking of 5G PHY-layer attacks based on efficiency and complexity.
channel, J/SF corresponds to the received power from the
jammer accumulated over one frame, divided by the received
power of the accumulated signal power over the entire 10 ms
UL or DL frame. Our calculations of J/SF assume FDD, since
the TDD mode has a lot of configurations and hence, requires a
separate analysis. The J/SF metric provides a convenient way
to compare each jamming attack against the baseline attack,
which is jamming the entire DL or UL frame.
Note that J/S alone does not provide enough information
to determine the affected area. Link budgets, which take into
account factors like the jammer’s transmit power and channel
attenuation, are needed to determine such information.
The vulnerability of each channel or signal is based primarily
on three factors:
1) The sparsity of the channel/signal w.r.t. the entire down-
link or uplink frame, i.e. the percent of REs occupied
by the channel/signal.
2) The jamming power needed to significantly corrupt the
channel or signal.
3) The complexity of the jammer required to perform such
an attack, based on whether synchronization to the cell
is needed and whether parameters need to be decoded.
This information for each channel and signal is summarized
in Table III. The sparsity can be combined with the minimum
J/SCH needed to estimate the corresponding J/SF . This is
an approximation because it assumes a uniform power spectral
density across the 5G NR downlink or uplink signal. From
the perspective of a jammer trying to minimize its power
consumption, a lower J/SF is better. To calculate the “% of
REs” column, which then gets used to calculate J/SF , we
have assumed a carrier frequency below 3 GHz, a channel
bandwidth of 20 MHz, and a subcarrier spacing of 30 kHz.
In order to approximate J/SCH needed for each attack to
cause DoS, we must find the SINR at which the modulation and
coding scheme for that channel causes a significantly high error
rate. Most of the control channels discussed use polar codes,
at various rates. It can be shown that around 0 dB SNR, polar
codes at rate 1⁄3 reach an extremely high bit error rate [11]. For
the synchronization signals, it must be corrupted to the point of
causing an extremely low probability of detection. Because of
the number of factors involved, these are only approximations,
although we will show that our J/SCH values only make up a
small portion of the J/SF metric; channel sparsity is typically
the decisive factor.
Based on the information provided in Table III, we can form
an initial threat assessment of the vulnerability of 5G NR to
jamming and RF spoofing. Because there is an efficiency and
complexity aspect to each attack, instead of simply ranking
them, we have assembled the attacks into a two-dimensional
plot that is shown in Figure 3. From the perspective of a
jammer, the most effective attacks are towards the bottom-right.
Specifically, we believe that efforts toward hardening 5G NR
for critical communications should focus on addressing possible
PSS spoofing and PBCH jamming attacks. Compared to the
same analysis of LTE (see [3], [12], [13]), 5G NR contains
fewer “extremely vulnerable” components. Specifically, LTE’s
PCFICH and PUCCH are especially vulnerable to jamming.
The PCFICH has been removed for 5G NR, and the PUCCH
is now mapped in a more dynamic manner, so that it cannot
be jammed simply by transmitting energy on the outer edges
of the uplink band.
It is important to understand that even the more complex
attacks can be implemented with widely available open-source
libraries, a low-cost SDR with a budget under $1000, and
basic Linux programming skills [12]. It is for this reason that
jamming mitigation should be strongly considered.
V. SURVEY OF MITIGATION TECHNIQUES
In this section we briefly describe some mitigation techniques
that do not require changes to the specifications, but instead
can be incorporated into implementations of 5G NR chipsets
and base stations. The technology inside of modern cellphones
and other UEs resides in the chipset. On the other side of the
link, the base stations typically use a baseband unit that does
most of the processing in software, and an RF module handles
the RF processing chain. Thus, changes to the behavior of the
base stations likely only require a software update, whereas
changes to the UE require a new chipset to be designed and
manufactured.
PSS spoofing can be mitigated by creating a timer for
receiving the SSS. If this timer expires, the UE should blacklist
the PSS for a certain amount of time, and choose the second
strongest cell within the same frequency. PSS and SSS spoofing
attacks can be mitigated by having the UE create a list of all
available cells in the given frequency channel along with their
received power levels [14]. The UE could then search for
the PBCH of the strongest cell and have another timer for
decoding the MIB. If this timer expires, the UE would look
for the PBCH of the next strongest cell, and so forth. One
important requirement for this approach is that the blacklist not
be limited to a certain number of “bad” cells, and that it has
some sort of knowledge decay so that an adversary transmitting
a different PSS every frame (both in terms of the sequence
TABLE III
CHANNEL AND SIGNAL MODULATION/CODING, SPARSITY, SYNCHRONIZATION AND CELL PARAMS REQUIREMENT, AND MINIMUM J/S TO CAUSE DOS
Channel/Signal Modulation Coding % of REs Synch. Required Params. Required J/SCH J/SF
PDSCH (Downlink) {4, 16, 64, 256}-QAM LDPC 90% No None 0 dB -1 dB
PBCH QPSK Polar 1.7% Yes None 0 dB -17 dB
PDCCH QPSK Polar 7% Yes Medium 0 dB -11 dB
PUSCH (Uplink) {4, 16, 64, 256}-QAM LDPC ∼ 90% No None 0 dB -1 dB
PUCCH QPSK Variety ∼ 10% Yes High 0 dB -10 dB
PRACH Zadoff-Chu Sequence N/A ∼ 2% Yes Medium 10 dB -7 dB
PSS (Spoofing) M-Sequences N/A 0.1% (3 PSSs) No None 10 dB -20 dB
SSS Gold Sequences N/A 0.3% Yes None 10 dB -15 dB
PBCH DM-RS QPSK N/A 0.4% Yes Low 3 dB -21 dB
and the timing offset) does not saturate the abilities of the
blacklisting mechanism.
Regarding sniffing and spoofing potential threats, 5G NR
still lacks the necessary protection to security threats that were
evident in LTE networks [15]. Broadcast messages, particularly
MIB and SIB packets, contain a myriad of information, not
all of which is necessary for the UE to establish a secured
connection. Ideally, SIB message content would be limited
to strictly what is necessary to establish a radio link with
the base station, and further network configuration elements
would be shared on a secured and integrity protected broadcast
channel. Moreover, both UEs and base station implicitly trust all
messages prior to authentication and encryption establishment,
which could lead to well know security exploits. It is necessary
to propose methods that allow a UE to determine whether a
base station is legitimate prior to executing certain procedures
based on the unauthenticated RRC and NAS messages, even
though the specifications do not require such mechanism.
These mitigation strategies only address a few of the attacks
that we discussed in this article. Further research on mitigation
techniques is needed. Developing solutions early on will ensure
a cost-effective and timely deployment and penetration into
many markets, as opposed to dealing with the consequences of
potential network failures in the future. Innovative solutions are
sought that lead to conceptual changes to how mission-critical
5G networks and UEs of the future are deployed and operated.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article we analyzed the vulnerability of 5G NR
to jamming, spoofing, and sniffing by looking at individual
physical channels and signals. Using barrage jamming as a
baseline, we have shown that more effective jamming methods
can be realized by exploiting the protocol. We used well-
established metrics related to the efficiency and complexity of
each method to compare them and conclude that the PSS and
PBCH are the weakest subsystems and should, therefore, be
addressed first. Compared to LTE, 5G NR is far less vulnerable
to jamming, mainly because of its dynamic nature and removal
of sparse control channels like the PCFICH. If 5G NR follows
the same pattern as 4G LTE, we can expect it to be highly
relied-upon during the next decade. We therefore recommend
that the identified mitigation techniques be considered before
deployment. Lastly, additional research is needed for testing
and advancing the 5G NR standard in terms of physical layer
security.
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